The whole idea of Elop Effect by Tomi Ahonen is that Nokia was increasing sales in 2010 and crashed in sales at Q1 2011. This is crucial as fact is that Nokia sales crashed at Q1 2011. If that would not be result of Elop Effect, then Nokia would have actually been in trouble already before strategy change.
I’ve covered some of this before, but there is one more “evidence” to cover:

I’m picking up a rather old case (Tomi refers to it March 20th 2012). It’s about Kantar survey. Originally Tomi refered to Kantar survey as proof of “Elop Effect”  causing Nokia’s Market Share collapse in Q1 2011.  That I have already pointed out not to be true (more here) But his take on Kantar stats have remained untouched. So what did Tomi say?

The facts are in. Kantar Worldpanel has just reported on its half yearly  reports from the UK market shares. The nice thing is that we have this  info from the same source nicely just before the Nokia Microsoft  partnership was announced, and along the way. We have four excellent  points in time. In late 2010, there was no partnership. In February of  last year, the partnership was announced. By September of 2011, it was  just before the first Nokia Lumia phones would start to ship, and now we  have seen five months of Lumia sales, so we are starting to see the  early patterns. All conveniently in the UK, one of Nokia’s best European  markets, and nicely, a country where there is no domestic handset rival  nor any domestic operating system maker rival to muddy up the picture.  And UK is one of those countries which is nicely a mix of roughly half  prepaid and half postpaid contract customers, and phones are sold partly  with subsidy and partly without subsidy. A good test laboratory for any  industrialized world market with a lot of relevance for the rest of  European sales for example. How did Lumia do?

September 2010 before Microsoft . . . . . . . 23.1% market share in UK (Symbian + Maemo)
February 2011 after Elop announcement . . 12.4% market share in UK (Symbian)
September 2011 just before Lumia launch . . 6.7% market share in UK (Symbian)
February 2012 after Lumia sold 4 months . . 4.6% market share in UK (Symbian + Windows Phone)

First. From just before Elop announcing his suicidal Microsoft strategy with the Elop Effect,  Nokia sold almost one in every four smartphones in the UK according to  Kantar. One year later, Nokia has lost four out of five customers it had  and sells only one out of every 20 smartphones sold in the same  country. This has been a comprehensively destructive strategy for Nokia  the former smartphone giant which used to dominate the UK market.”  [1]

So… After Elop effect, immediate drop of 10.7 points (or decrease of 46%). Sounds terrible!
But before I go to details, let’s note that this is not one-time only case Tomi uses this data. Tomi also refers to Kantar survey as a proof of Lumia line failure:

Nokia’s market share of new sales in the summer of 2010  in Britain was 33% according to Kantar. That was the best market share  of any smartphone maker in Britain. iPhone came second and Blackberry  third. This bodes very well for Nokia and Lumia as these customers are  coming in to replace their smartphones now in 2012.

Except  that something wild happened between 2010 and today. Nokia did not make  an utterly failing phone like the N97 or one with a technical error  like the Antennagate of the iPhone 4. The rivals did not come in 2011  with superphones with unbelievable features like say time travel or  teleportation. Nokia gave ever better phones with better features (E7,  X7, N9) and the Symbian OS released ever better editions and the Nokia  Ovi store became the second-bestselling app store and everything was  improving at Nokia. I am NOT saying Nokia had somehow magically caught  up with the iPhone but the fact is, Nokia had a record Christmas Quarter  in 2010, and then things were improving for 2011. Improving! This for  the brand that had highest loyalty in Britain at the time!

So  what happened to Nokia sales in Britain in 12 months. Kantar gives  Nokia’s market share in the summer of 2011 as .. 11%. Nokia had been the  market share leader, with the best loyalty in the nation, and then  produced ever better phones including one of Britain’s best smartphones  of the year – and its rivals did nothing spectacular – remembering the  iPhone 4 had already been released by summer 2010 and the 4S was delayed  till Autumn 2011. And Blackberry had its dramatic market failure in  this period. Yet Nokia lost two thirds of its customers in just one  year. What happened?

The British know what is the Ratner Effect and what is the Osborne Effect.  Nokia’s CEO Stephen Elop decided that one utter communciation disaster  like Ratner Effect is not enough, he compounded it with an Osborne  Effect. Both of those communication disasters independently ruined their  respective companies, Ratners and Osborne. Elop doubled down and made  the most costly management communciation fiasco in the economic history  of mankind and devastated Nokia’s brand and market demand. He combined  the Osborne Effect with the Ratner Effect in something I now call the Elop Effect. Elop single-handedly wiped out Nokia’s demand in February 2011. He ruined Nokia’s brand.

Its not limited to Britain, obviously. Kantar reported the same crash  of Nokia smartphone new sales in all European markets. Similar stats  come from all around the world and obviously Nokia’s own reported  smartphone unit sales tell the same morose tale. In 2010 Nokia grew  smartphone sales by 47% from the year before. Elop took that growth and  torpedoed it, and for 2011 Nokia global market share collapsed from 29%  in Q4 of 2010 to about 12% in Q4 of 2011 (we will know when Nokia  releases its Q4 results shortly). This happened while the global  smartphone industry exploded in 2011 growing by 59% from the year  before.

Nokia brand is sheer garbage today. So the second most  important thing customers ask for, which was a strong Nokia asset, has  been ruined not by manufacturing errors or market forces, by Nokia’s CEO  with his idiotic communications last February. So maybe we can find  salvage from the Microsoft side of this partnership. Or maybe not.”  [2]

Weird enough, Tomi has totally different numbers for Kantar this time. It seems he has used even older data for 2010 (previous was from autumn 2010, when Nokia had 23.1% market share). Now he already reveals us that Nokia had 33% market share in summer 2010 and crashed to 23.1%! That’s hardly looking like “a record Christmas Quarter  in 2010, and then things were improving for 2011“.
But let’s see how things improved from that 23.1%, shall we? It should be noted that Kantar report is about OS percentages, not Manufacturer percentages. So Tomi has already added his own math to count Nokia’s share of Symbian phones. E.g. in UK market shares Tomi reports 23.1% and 12.4%, whereas Symbian in Kantar report has 26.0% and 14.2% market shares, respectively. (Kantar does not specify MeeGo so I have to assume Tomi did additional math to include that.) Now I don’t know if he uses Nokia’s global share of Symbian phones or some local share, but Nokia was so dominating in Symbian that we can assume Symbian sales to fall in the same rate as Nokia sales. (Nokia has approximately 87% share of Symbian in Tomi’s counts).

Beauty here is that Kantar stat are not some secret survey results, so anyone can get Kantar stats if you know someone who happens to have it (I spent extra effort there, according to a friend I could have just ordered that directly from Kantar).
So Kantar report market shares of Symbian (numbers Tomi refers the first time [1]):

Country  Sep 21st 2010  Feb 20th 2011
UK         26.0%          14.2%
Germany    47.3%          30.5%
France     30.1%          22.3%
Italy      63.1%          49.8%

Two other markets with different compare date (same date Tomi used in later post [2]):

Country    Jun 13th 2010  Feb 20th 2011
U.S.         10.1%          1.3%
Australia    43.9%         30.6%

Now to the actual thing (which was very conveniently pointed out to Tomi in the comments of his blog):

As you  say – in September 2010 Symbian market share was 23.1%. In February 2011  it was only 12.4%. Nokia/Symbian lost 46% of its market share between  September 2010 and February 2011. Are you saying that this happened  because of Elop effect?
How could it? Windows Phone strategy was announced on Friday Feb.  11th. Kantar surveys do not include the whole last month. This year’s  survey lasted 12 weeks and ended on Feb 19th. There is absolutely no way  Elop effect/announcement/memo could have had any significant impact on  last year’s Kantar February survey. Not in 1-2 weeks before survey was  completed.” [3]

Now Kantar tells us their time used to gather data: “The latest 12 week ending smartphone OS  market share data is released every four weeks.” And we know the 12 week (84 days) period ended February 20th, 2011.
Elop made announcement at morning time of February 11th, 2011. Let’s then assume that Nokia sold ZERO phones (unlikely) during February 11th to February 20th (10days). Now we can fix the numbers by multiplying Symbian sales by 114% (84/74) and then recount the market shares. (I assume people bought some other phone instead of a Nokia one so I can just multiply market share percent directly. This gives us highest market share percentage Symbian (and Nokia) could have achieved.)

Country   Sep 21st 2010  Feb 20th 2011  Market share change
 UK         26.0%          16.2%          -37%
 Germany    47.3%          34.8%          -26%
 France     30.1%          25.4%          -15%
 Italy      63.1%          56.8%          -10%

Two other markets with different compare date:

Country    Jun 13th 2010  Feb 20th 2011  Market share change
 U.S.        10.1%          1.5%          -85%
 Australia   43.9%         34.9%          -20%

Now this is ultimate best case scenario. If Nokia’s sales did not drop to zero at February 11th, we get lower market share. If people who did not buy Nokia did not buy some other brand either, we get lower market share.
So in as-favourable-for-Tomi-as-possible scenario we STILL have Symbian (and Nokia) losing market share in every single market measured, whether there was Elop Effect or not. UK figure is particularly ugly. It started from 33% in summer and dropped before elop was even in the house (Tomi provided these numbers). For rest of the scale (as Tomi likes to put it): “Nokia lost a third of its customers! In just one quarter!” – but without Elop Effect.
And Nokia indeed “Nokia lost two thirds of its customers” from summer 2010 to beginning of 2011, without Elop Effect. Worst thing is this:

This is disasterous, and honestly, I DID NOT SEE this coming. I wrote on this blog a year ago, that I expect year 2012 to see a 1 to 1 conversion, as Symbian declines, the Windows Phone (ie Lumia) smartphones by Nokia will replace them. For every Symbian lost there will be 1 for 1 a Windows Phone gain by Nokia. That was a reasonable assumption. That is now proven not to be true. Nokia lost one third of its last remaining loyal customer base, when trying to force them to take Lumia smartphones over the past five months.” [1]

Tomi? You okay? Have you slept enough?
Nokia lost those customers way before the Windows Phone announcement (or Lumia devices) even existed. How on earth do you expect those to be replaced “1 to 1 conversion”?
(But I do like the fact you used word “honest” there.)

I wonder why Tomi sticks with this? The survey only proves that Nokia was losing market share massively already in 2010 and industry growth was just hiding it. But on the other hand, he was the one who originally reported it.
(I did recently mention that Tomi is either incredibly incompetent or incredible liar. This fits to the picture.)




[3] Comment from karlim